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Abstract: We follow Pollard (2007) in assuming that the mainstream Kripke/Montague-
inspired possible-worlds semantics is “a framework known to have dubious foundations”
(primarily because of the granularity problem), and “worlds are constructed from propositions
[. . .], and not the other way around”. We intend to work out this approach in a DRT-based
framework, called ReALIS, in order to account for phenomena concerning referent accessi-
bility, at the same time. We claim that our system offers a general solution to problems of
intensional identity, and it is devoid of DRT’s “extra level” problem—by embedding discourse
representations in the world model, not directly but as parts of the representations of inter-
preters’ minds, i.e., their (permanently changing) information states/“internal worlds”. Hence,
there is simply no intensionality in ReALIS as interpreters’ “worldlets” (in description of their
brains within the entire model of the universe) carry all kinds of information (BDI, guesswork,
dream) typically “entrusted to” possible worlds.
Keywords: (eliminative) possible-worlds semantics, dynamic semantics, intensionality
∗ We are grateful to SROP-4.2.1.B-10/2/KONV/2010/KONV-2010-0002 (Devel-
oping Competitiveness of Universities in the Southern Transdanubian Region)
for their contribution to our costs at SinFonIJa 4 (2011, Budapest) and ensur-
ing the working of Research Team ReALIS for Theoretical, Computational and
Cognitive Linguistics. We would also like to thank all three reviewers very much
for their great efforts and numerous precious comments.
This paper is the first part of a pair of papers. The second part (Alberti–
Kleiber 2012) offers a review on the status of ReALIS within seminal related
works in the field on the basis of the questions and comments due to the three
anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this paper.
1216–8076/$ 20.00 © 2012 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
4 GÁBOR ALBERTI– JUDIT KLEIBER
Our starting-point is Pollard’s (2007, 33) conclusion pertaining to the
mainstream Kripke/Montague-inspired possible-worlds semantics: “the
idea of taking worlds as a primitive of semantic theory is a serious mis-
step”. Section 1 offers a review of the most stubborn problems that the
discipline of formal semantics suffers from.
We are searching a general solution in an approach based on em-
bedding discourse representations in the world model, but not directly
but as parts of the representations of interpreters’ minds, i.e., their (per-
manently changing) information states/their “internal worlds”. We call
this approach ReALIS: REciprocal And Lifelong Interpretation System.
In Section 2 we sketch a few relevant properties of this (S)DRT-based
theory; out of which the crucial one is that there is simply no intension-
ality in ReALIS as interpreters’ “worldlets” (in description of their brains
within the entire model of the universe) carry all kinds of information
(BDI, guesswork, dream) typically “entrusted to” possible worlds.
It is shown in Section 3 how Pollard’s (2007) granularity prob-
lems (Hesperus/Phosphorus, omniscience) are solved—practically “dis-
appear”—in ReALIS, due to regarding internal “images” of entities of
the world as entities as well. Section 4 shows our solution to linguistic
problems concerning beliefs (modal anchoring, Hob/Nob sentences).1
1. Dubious foundations of (post-)Montagovian formal systems
1.1. Granularity problems
Our starting point is Pollard’s (2007) criticism on the mainstream Kripke/
Montague-inspired possible-worlds semantics.
He calls it “a framework known to have dubious foundations” (op.cit.,
1) primarily because of the granularity problem, illustrated in (1) below,
and he is led to the conclusion that “the idea of taking worlds as a
1 Alberti–Kleiber (2012) offers a systematic review of phenomena concerning iden-
tity/identification of entities (e.g. that of actors and stunt men, that of Theseus’
ships). To meet the requirements of all three anonymous reviewers of the first
version of this paper, we have devoted the major part of the second article to
the comparison of ReALIS with seminal related works in the field: Landman’s
(1986) theory on partial objects and DRT (Kamp et al. 2011), for instance. We
also suggest that ReALIS, due to its mind representation, can be regarded as a
formal cognitive system (e.g., Schnell 2006).
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primitive of semantic theory is a serious misstep” (op.cit., 33). Even the
seminal book of teaching Montague Grammar (Dowty et al. 1981, 124)
admits these “dubious foundations” in the course of discussing the prob-
lem of necessity and possibility: “Would this be an enlightening way of
analyzing the semantics of necessity and possibility? Many philosophers
of language have unequivocally answered “no” to this question; they have
contended that since “possible worlds” are surely vague and ill-understood
entities [. . .], it cannot help to explain one mysterious semantic concept
(necessity) in terms of an even more mysterious one (possible worlds)”
(italicized by the authors).
(1) Types of the granularity problem:
(a) The ancients realized that
[Hesperus was Hesperus]S1/[Hesperus was Phosphorus]S2.
(b) Jim knows [Phil is a woodchuck]S1/[Phil is a groundhog]S2.
(c) Problem of omniscience: Paris Hilton knows that
[10 is greater than 7]S1/[there are infinitely many (twin) prime numbers]S2 (S3).
(d) A conversation overheard in ancient Babylonia:
“Look, there is Hesperus, brighter than it was yesterday.”
“Phosphorus was also bright this morning.”
“Really? It wasn’t that bright yesterday.”
Hesperus and Phosphorus in (1a) (→Venus), woodchuck and groundhog in
(1b) (→the same marmot-like species), and the three constantly true sen-
tence variants in (1c) have (pairwise) the same referential content whilst
(1a/S1) and (1c/S1) are trivially true in contrast to the contingent state-
ments (1a/S2), (1c/S2), (1c/S3)2 and the also contingent ones (1b/S1)
and (1b/S2) which may potentially take distinct truth values.
What this comparison between (natural human intuition on) mean-
ings of these sentences shows, can be summarized as follows: having the
same reference/meaning is not a sufficient condition to allow replacement
of one name/sentence for another in a larger expression while preserving
truth—that is what Pollard calls the Granulatity Problem and qualifies
2 To be more precise, the theorem pertaining to twin prime numbers (1c/S3) is
only a conjecture that has not been proved so far (a few examples of twin prime
numbers: 〈3, 5〉, 〈5, 7〉, 〈11, 13〉, 〈17, 19〉, 〈29, 31〉, 〈41, 43〉). If it is true, never-
theless, then it is “as true as” the fact that 10 is greater than 7; whilst the sets of
those knowing S1/S2/S3 are three radically different sets (cca. everybody/those
interested in mathematics/nobody).
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as the critical problem that the mainstream Kripke/Montague-inspired
possible-worlds semantics suffers from.
Landman (1986, 97) discusses another aspect of the Hesperus–
Phosphorus problem, the problem of “intersubjective agreement”, illus-
trated in (1d) above. He argues,
“in using the word ‘Hesperus’ both persons assume that they talk about the
same object. [. . .] How come, they are at the same time so sure that they
talk about the same things, and not each of them about their own private
experiences, and still are not aware that the things they talk about are
actually one and the same object?”
He formulates the essence of the problem that he calls “the main problem
in semantics since Frege” as follows:
“Where are the objects we talk about? If they are in our minds, then the
above conversation involves four objects, two for each language user; if they
are in the world, then it involves only one object, the planet Venus. But if
we ask the Babylonians themselves, the two would not disagree about the
number of objects: there are two: Hesperus and Phosphorus. [. . .] The task
of semantics is to find the proper place for this intersubjective agreement
[2 objects], in between subjectivity [4 objects] and objectivity [1 object].”
1.2. Problem of the compositionality of reference
Another problem mentioned by Pollard (2007, 30–1; see also his footnote
36) lies in “the standard view, [viz.] reference is compositional”.
(2) The problem of using the customary sense as the reference:
[(Justin Timberlake knows that) [Paris Hilton believes [snow is white]S3 ]S2 ]S1.
That is why, claims Pollard, “Frege had to resort to claiming that utter-
ances of sentences in certain contexts [e.g. S3 in (2)] had the customary
sense as the reference,” which requires “sleight of hand”.
1.3. Problems of accessibility of referents
A third stubborn problem of the mainstream post-Montagovian formal se-
mantics, which is the starting point of DRT (Kamp et al. 2011), concerns
distinct accessibility of certain referents (3a–b) in logically equivalent
sentences (3c):
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(3) Problem of referent accessibility and DRT’s solution:
(a) [[A delegate arrived.]S1 She registered.]Discourse1
(b) [[It is not the case that every delegate failed to arrive.]S2
*She registered.]Discourse2
(c) The formulae attributed to S1 and S2 are logically equivalent:
∃xΦ⇔ ¬∀x¬Phi.
(d) The representation of Discourse1/Discourse2 in DRT:
“Enclosed”, x is not accessible to y.
DRT’s solution relies on placing referents belonging to pronouns and
(other) definite and indefinite nominal expressions in a hierarchical “box
structure” calculated on the basis of sentence and discourse structure.
The elementary box structure above to the left corresponds to the simpler
discourse (3a), with referent x belonging to a delegate and y belonging to
she. As referents x and y can be found in the same “box”, x is defined to
be accessible to y—which accounts for the successful coreference between
the pronoun and the indefinite nominal expression. In the complex box
structure, however, which corresponds to the logically complex discourse
in (3b), the embedded boxes (whose subordinate status is due to negation
and universal quantification) practically “hide” referent x from referent
y—which accounts for the failure of coreference between the pronoun and
the indefinite nominal expression.
1.4. The problem of “extra level”
DRT’s solution comes with the cost of introducing an extra level of
representation, that of discourse (representation) structures (3d), i.e.,
DRSs.
Those insisting on Montague’s “heritage” (e.g., Groenendijk–Stokhof
1991) qualify DRSs as an illegitimate extra level of representation be-
tween syntactic structure and the model of world in the course of inter-
pretation, which can—and necessarily should—be eliminated.
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1.5. Problems of intensional identity
This subsection is devoted to the demonstration of two (related) problems
concerning intensional identity, which often occur in the literature of
formal semantics.
(4) The Hob-Nob problem and the puzzle of modal anchoring:
(a) Hob believes that a witch has killed Cob’s cow and
Nob thinks that she has blighted Bob’s sow.
(b) Mary thought that there was a castle behind the trees.
The castle turned out to be a huge oak tree.
The “Hob-Nob Problem” is sketched by Kamp et al. (2011, 5.4) as follows:
“Geach [1962] pointed out that this sentence [(4a)] could be used truthfully in
a report composed by a journalist describing the goings-on in some remote
rural backwater, even if the journalist herself is persuaded that witches do
not exist. This is a problem for the application of standard logical nota-
tion to the representation of truth-conditional content. For in order that
the pronoun she in the belief attribution to Nob be bound by the “exis-
tential quantifier” a witch in the belief attribution to Hob, this quantifier
would have to take scope over the two belief attributions. But this would,
on the standard interpretation of quantification theory, imply that there are
witches in the world in which Hob, Nob and the journalist live. That is some-
thing to which the journalist would under no conditions want to commit
herself. And it is something to which . . . [(4a)] does not commit her.”
Following Roberts (1996b, 237), we can add that “the problem of inten-
sional identity in [Hob-Nob examples (4a)] . . . reduces to the more gen-
eral problem of intensional identity, i.e. identity across possible worlds.
Such an approach, of course, encounters difficult problems in attempting
to specify what it is for two individuals to believe in the existence of
the same, possibly mythical entity (see Lewis (1986) and the references
therein).”
The similar puzzle in the two-sentence text (4b) is that “a noun
phrase [the castle] is modally subordinated to a constituent occurring in
previous discourse, while the sentence the noun phrase is part of is not
modally subordinated” (Farkas 1993, quoted by Roberts 1996a, 243). This
contradictory case means a serious problem to semantic theories based
on the elimination of possible worlds, as different parts of the sentence in
question require distinct ways of eliminating possible worlds.
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2. Foundations of ReALIS
We follow Pollard (2007, 34) in assuming that “worlds are constructed
from propositions [. . .], and not the other way around” (1.1–2), but intend
to work out this approach in a DRT-based framework, called ReALIS, in
order to account for phenomena concerning referent accessibility (1.3),
at the same time. We claim, however, that our system is devoid of DRT’s
“extra level” problem (1.4) and offers a general solution to problems of
intensional identity (1.5).
ReALIS, REciprocal And Lifelong Interpretation System, can be
introduced as a new “post-Montagovian” theory (Dowty et al. 1981)
concerning the formal interpretation of sentences constituting coherent
discourses (Kamp et al. 2011), with a lifelong model of lexical, interper-
sonal and cultural/encyclopedic knowledge of interpreters in its center
including their reciprocal knowledge on each other. In what follows we
sketch a few relevant properties of ReALIS. We also offer the interested
reader our new publications in Hungarian (see Alberti 2011a;b and fur-
ther references therein), and the 40-page-long definition system in English
(Alberti 2009: http://lingua.btk.pte.hu/realispapers).
What is relevant here is that in our approach, DRSs—gigantic ones,
of course—are used as lifelong representations of interpreters’ informa-
tion states (Alberti 2000), and what serve as ilks that play the role of
possible worlds are embedded DRS boxes, which are practically finite in-
formation pools not closed under logical operations. Due to unbounded
embedding of “boxes”, we can express interpreters’ beliefs/desires/in-
tentions including BDI’s concerning BDI’s (concerning BDI’s)* of each
other. An interpreter’s information state, thus, is captured formally as a
labeled tree system of “worldlets” (the above mentioned finite informa-
tion pools) and can be construed practically as the description of his/her
brain—his/her “internal world”, which is a part of the entire world model
also containing the external world.
Hence, ReALIS requires no extra level of representation (1.4), as
discourse representations, in company with representations of other con-
tents of the above mentioned internal worlds, are not outside the world
model—see the comparison in (5) below.
In order to understand all details, we should return to Montague’s
heritage mentioned in 1.4. He himself also applied a level of represen-
tation between syntactic structure and world model: a level of logical
formulae, about which he proved that theoretically this level can be elim-
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inated (Dowty et al. 1981). Linguistic problems like the one sketched
in 1.3, however, seem to have proven the opposite, some principle of
“discourse representationalism”. Dekker (2000), a researcher belonging to
Groenendijk and Stokhof’s antirepresentationalist Amsterdam Circle in
the nineties, tends to accept in 2000 that “some [intermediate] level of
representation is indispensable in modeling the interpretation of natural
language”.
The thesis of ReALIS in this context, then, can be formulated as fol-
lows: By embedding discourse representations in the world model, we can
get rid of the intermediate level of representation while preserving its con-
tent and relevant structural characteristics; and this idea can be carried
out in the larger-scale framework of embedding discourse representations
in the world model not directly but as parts of the representations of inter-
preters’ minds, i.e., their (permanently changing) information states, that
is, their internal worlds. We argue that in this way representationalists’
useful referent hierarchies (1.3) are saved while antirepresentationalists’
principal theoretical demand pertaining to the elimination of the extra
level of representation has also been satisfied.
It might be raised that in the ReALIS approach a double nature is
attributed to human minds, which might cause a critical meta-theoretical
difficulty: they are representations about the “world outside”, on the one
hand, but—as parts of the entire world model—they are to be represented
as well, on the other.
This is no theoretical problem, however, if we apply a simultane-
ously recursive definition of “the whole”: the world “outside” and all
interpreters’ permanently changing information states (Alberti 2011a,
http://lingua.btk.pte.hu/realispapers).
ReALIS, thus, can be formally defined by simultaneous recursion
as an epistemic multi-agent system R = 〈Wo, W, Dyn, Tru〉 (Fagin
et al. 1995) where “agents” get information about the world around them
(including each other’s brains). Wo denotes the external world, a “full
history”, on the basis of which both static (truth-conditional) evalua-
tion (Tru) and dynamic (DRS-constructing) interpretation (Dyn) can be
carried out, in cooperation with each other (Kamp et al. 2011). W is
a function where W[i,t] is interpreter i’s information state (= internal
world) at moment t. W[i,t] is a labeled tree system of worldlets, as has
been mentioned. The interpretation of modal sentences can be based on
certain worldlets instead of the external world W.
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What this means is no less than there is simply no intensional-
ity in ReALIS as interpreters’ worldlets (in description of their brains
within the entire model of the universe) carry all kinds of information
(BDI, guesswork, dream) typically “entrusted to” possible worlds. In
other words, interpretation is always extensional, with its basis either
Wo or a sector of an i’s W[i,t], or, quite frequently, some combination of
the external world and one or more interpreters’ different worldlets.
This approach can also be formulated as a hypothesis: all (linguistic)
problems whose solution is held to require possible worlds can be solved
by means of worldlets.
What kinds of problems should this model face? Numerous problems
have appeared and further ones may appear in the course of precisely
defining ReALIS —but nothing has seemed to ultimately block the en-
deavor as a whole. The analyses in the following sections of the most
stubborn problems in the area are intended to persuade the reader.
3. How do granularity problems disappear in ReALIS?
3.1. Stars and twins: Anchoring internal entities to external ones
and to each other
A critical difference between the approach of ReALIS and that of DRT
lies in the choice of basic objects of the theoretical model: in DRT every
concept relies on (the “box structure” of) DRSs whilst in ReALIS it is
the universe of (external and internal) entities that a multiply complex
network of relations is based upon.
In ReALIS each instance of observation of an external entity by an
interpreter comes with producing a new internal entity, a referent, in
his/her internal world. Identifying referents in this approach is anchor-
ing one to another (rk → rl) by a relation α, which requires a step of
accommodation considered to depend on the interpreter’s decision chiefly
on the basis of pragmatic facts.
Let us turn to the problem of Evening/Morning Star, whose illustra-
tion is repeated in (5) below. What is decisive here is that external iden-
tity provides a natural basis for internal identification, of course—what
can be regarded as an instance of perfect observation; but internal iden-
tification ultimately depends on the interpreter and nobody else. The
figure in (6′) serves as an illustration of this dependence.
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(5) Partial observation of external entities:
→(1a) The ancients realized that
[Hesperus was Hesperus]S1/[Hesperus was Phosphorus]S2.
(6) False observation of external entities:
Mary believes that
[the married Peter Caruthers is the same person as the bachelor Paul Caruthers]S1
/ [who kissed Sue on Monday is the same person as who kissed Doris on Friday]S2.
(5′) partial observation (6′) false observation
Referents r1, r2, r3 in (6′) are intended to register observations, at a se-
quence of moments, of Venus in the evening sky by an ancient astronomer;
and r4, r5, r6 are observations of Venus in the morning sky. Referent r2
is easy to anchor to r1, and r3 is also easy to anchor to r2 : they are ob-
served in similar positions in the evening sky. Referents r4, r5 and r6 are
also easy to anchor to each other. Anchoring r4 to r3, however, requires
profound knowledge of astronomy; accommodating the piece of informa-
tion concerning the identity of r4 and r3, hence, is an accommodation
that can be supposed to be such that certain interpreters will perform
while others will not. Interpreters belonging to the latter group can be
said to get partial observation (Alberti 2009, 2.1.4.5/2011a, 4.1.4.5) of
the external entity Venus. The solution relies on the assumption that in-
terpreters’ internal worlds consist of logically not closed, finite pools of
information, referred to in section 2 as worldlets.
The same style of solution is at hand for the problem of indis-
tinguishable twins, illustrated in (6) above. Thus Peter and Paul are
supposed to be indistinguishable twin brothers. Nevertheless, if Mary is
a rational person, the version of (6/S1) is strange: to believe in the iden-
tity of two persons with different names and different marital statuses,
whilst version (6/S2) is completely all right under appropriate conditions.
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Let us consider the figure in (6′) above. Referents r1, r2 and r3 in
Mary’s internal world are supposed to have come from observations of
Peter while the other three referents, also belonging to Mary’s universe
of internal entities, correspond to his twin brother Paul. Here anchoring of
r4 to r3 is an instance of accommodation which Mary is likely to perform
if she does not know, for instance, that his colleague Peter has a brother
at all. Performing this accommodation depends on Mary alone and it is a
rational operation on the basis of the brothers’ exterior similarity. What
has been discussed here can be called a case of false observation: in the
interpreter’s information state has appeared a class of identified referents
belonging to different entities outside.
This solution also relies on the assumption that interpreters’ inter-
nal worlds consist of logically not closed, finite worldlets. In the ideal, or
default, case, obviously, worldlets are true reflections of a finite segment
of the external world, in the precise sense that they show an isomor-
phic picture of the entity structure outside. Creating this internal picture
typically requires trivial steps of accommodation; but do require accom-
modation, so potentially there might appear cases when a necessary step
of accommodation will not be performed or a wrong step of accommo-
dation will be performed. The famous semantic problems capture these
very cases.
3.2. Equivalent statements in internal worlds
This subsection is devoted to the problem of equivalent statements in
modal contexts, mentioned in (1b–c) as a special case of what Pollard
(2007) calls the Granularity Problem. Our solution relies also on the
approach that internal worldlets reflecting the external world are finite
pools of information not (automatically) closed under logical operations
in contrast to possible worlds.
In ReALIS, thus, logical operations may take place as accommo-
dations in appropriate worldlets, interpreter-dependently to a certain
extent, and not automatically. Worldlets may be regarded as construc-
tions “converging into”, but never arriving at, logically closed, infinite
possible-world constructions.
Suppose, for instance, Mary knows all the axioms on the basis of
which theorems e1, e2 and e3 in (7a–c) below can be proved. If theorem
e3 is true (see fn. 3), then the three theorems are equivalently true in
every “rational” possible world (which are based upon the customary
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mathematical axioms) while the three modal sentences in (7a–c) are not
equivalent at all: (7a) is obviously true, (7c) is obviously false, and (7b)
is dependent on Mary’s knowledge on maths. Figure (7h) shows how this
radical difference can be accounted for in the approach offered by the
model of ReALIS.
(7) Incontingent truths:
(a) Mary knows that [10 is greater than 7]e1. →(1c)
(b) Mary knows that [there are infinitely many prime numbers]e2. →(1c)
(c) Mary knows that [there are infinitely many twin prime numbers]e3. →(1c)
(d–f) We need a prime number greater than 200. . .
(d) 210 may be a good choice. (e4 : “210 is a prime number.”)
(e) 221 may be a good choice. (e5 : “221 is a prime number.”)
(f) 211 may be a good choice. (e6 : “211 is a prime number.”)
(g) Jim knows [Phil is a woodchuck]S1/[Phil is a groundhog]S2. →(1b)
(h)
What corresponds to the well-known “box structure” of DRT is the la-
beled partial ordering of worldlets in ReALIS (Alberti 2009, 1.2.4/2011a,
3.2.4). We would like to demonstrate these labels by means of the repre-
sentations in (7h). They are quadruples providing the following factors of
a label: its modality (belief/desire/intention/supposition/etc.), its direct
host, its moment and its polarity (positive/neutral/negative). What is
described by the upper box triplet in (7h), then, is that at a moment t ′
Mary (rM) strongly “believes in” (the trivial) e1 while she has not de-
cided if e2 and e3 are true or false—independently of what is real in the
external world. Theorem e2, for instance, is true in the external world,
and Mary may be assumed to have reached an information state, at a
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 59, 2012
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moment t ′′′, in which e2 has already got in the positive worldlet sector,
which corresponds to the external fact that e2 is true. This change re-
quires much thinking (or learning), which can be regarded as a form of
accommodation, again, in our approach. We can also measure the amount
of accommodation by assuming that e2 appears in the positive sector of
a worldlet responsible for someone’s knowledge not so soon as t ′′ but only
later (at t ′′′), and e3 will never enter a positive sector like this.
We show another problem in order to demonstrate this toolbox of
ReALIS convincingly. Let us compare the three two-sentence discourses
in (7d–f). On the one hand, (7e–f) are reasonable statements in contrast
to (7d), as 210 is obviously no prime number. On the other hand, however,
(7d–e) are in opposition to (7f), because it is only the number mentioned
in (7f) is a prime number as 221=13 · 17 in (7e).
In the approach due toReALIS, both sides can be accounted for. The
external truth concerning the numbers in question is captured by the final
three-sector worldlet at moment t ′′′ in (7h) above: eventualities e4, e5 and
e6 are distributed according to this external truth, expressing that Mary
can reach an information state truly reflecting the facts that only 211 is a
prime number. The series of information states, however, expresses that
211 and 221 are similar in the respect that they are not easy to decide if
they belong to the class of primes. This decision (“removing” e5 and e6
from a neutral worldlet of belief into one of +/− polarity) requires much
more accommodation from the interpreter than that concerning e4.
3.3. Synonyms in modal contexts
It is worth devoting a separate subsection to the problem of synonyms,
whose illustration was repeated in (7g) above, with respect to its connec-
tion to the general question of lexical acquisition.
In the light of what has been said so far our proposal is straight-
forward: despite that woodchucks and groundhogs are the same in the
external world, it is only Jim’s internal world W[rJim,t] that counts.
Hence, the two sentences in (7g) above may be assigned different truth
values, depending on the finite content of Jim’s corresponding worldlets
of knowledge.
One might think that this solution is suspiciously simple; and what
ReALIS will not be capable of capturing is the prototypical case in which
sentences containing synonymous words are evaluated alike even in modal
contexts like the one shown in (7g).
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This is not the case, fortunately. Our toolbox is straightforwardly
suitable for formally indicating the anomalous nature of the relevant
sector of Jim’s internal world. What can be defined as the ideal case is
when worldlets of knowledge of interpreters truly reflect corresponding
sectors of the external world. It would threaten the “survival” of a com-
munity of speakers if the “anomalous situation” occurred too frequently.
That is why the content of worldlets of knowledge is to be hypothesized
to “converge into” a state of more and more truly mapping the external
world. This approach practically provides a theory concerning language
acquisition, i.e., children’s acquisition of lexical meanings as these mean-
ings have been conventionalized in their parents’ community—remaining
a certain amount of possibility open for “mutation”.
4. The extensional treatment of beliefs in ReALIS
4.1. Truth-conditional evaluation on the basis of the content
of human brains
First of all, let us return to the problem of compositionality of refer-
ence (1.2). As a preparation, we should sketch how the two kinds of
interpretation (Kamp et al. 2011) are captured in ReALIS.
Dynamic interpretation of a sentence (or rather, discourse) is defined
as extending the interpreter’s information state (Alberti 2009, 2.2/2011,
4.2). What practically takes place in the course of this extension is that
new sectors are built up in the interpreter’s internal world due to the
(morpheme by morpheme) consumption of the input performance: there
will appear new blocks of partially ordered labeled worldlets.
The ideal interpreter, for instance, will construct the worldlet system
shown in (8b) below as (the relevant part of) the dynamic interpretation
of (8a)=(2) (and then (s)he is to embed it in his/her earlier internal world
by anchoring this “floating” block of worldlets to the “activated” point(s)
of the information state; where this activation is controlled by anaphoric
and presupposition-carrying expressions). The information (8b) expresses
is as follows from worldlet to worldlet: The interpreter attributes a piece of
knowledge (“maximal” belief) to Justin Timberlake (e1 ), which pertains
to a belief of Paris Hilton (e2 ). This belief (e2 ) pertains to a proposi-
tion concerning snow according to which the supposition that something
(referent r3 ) is of snow (e3 ) typically implies that it’s white (e4 ).
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Static interpretation (truth evaluation) of a sentence is defined on the
basis of the external world Wo or/and the content of certain worldlets of
potentially more interpreters (Alberti 2009, 2.3/2011, 4.3). It is the union
of these structures (Wo+W[i,t])) that the structure of the representation
which is the output of dynamic interpretation (W[i,t]) is to be compared
with: whether a sufficient pattern matching can be pointed out.
Now the truth of (8a), partly depending on the precise interpreta-
tion of the English verbs know and believe, is primarily determined by
the content of two internal worlds, those of Justin Timberlake and Paris
Hilton. (8a) is true if the worldlet quadruplet in (8b) is isomorphic to
a sector of JT’s internal world (“he does know S2”) and the worldlet
triplet in (8c) is isomorphic to a sector of PH’s internal world (“she does
believe S3”). This ‘isomorphism’ is a kind of pattern matching, like tradi-
tional interpretation, which is essentially pattern matching, too, between
some representation of sentence structure and some model of the external
world.
What makes the former pattern matching possible in ReALIS, is
that the output of dynamic interpretation (genuinely a representation)
will simultaneously serve as a contribution to the world model.
(8) How to represent and interpret BDI?
(a) [(Justin Timberlake knows that) [Paris Hilton believes [snow is white]S3]S2]S1.
→(2)
(b)
4.2. Modal anchoring
As was pointed out in 1.5, cross-reference between elements in distinct
modal contexts, i.e.,modal anchoring, means a serious problem to seman-
tic theories based on the elimination of possible worlds, as different parts
of the sentence/discourse in question require distinct ways of eliminating
possible worlds. What correspond to these “distinct modal contexts” in
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ReALIS, however, belong to the same world model (as all internal worlds
belong to the same, single, world model); hence, their referents can be
anchored to each other (under appropriate conditions).
The representation in (9a), for instance, shows the relevant part of
an ideal interpreter’s dynamic interpretation. The contribution of the
first sentence is a referent r ′ with the piece of information that “Mary
believes that she has seen that it is a castle”. The second sentence con-
tains a singular definite description, the castle. This sentence relies on the
speaker’s perspective, and not Mary’s one; nevertheless, the retrieval of
the antecedent is successful. How is this possible?
Unicity is the relevant factor: there must be a worldlet containing a
referent that is unique in that worldlet in the respect that the content
of the singular definite description holds true of it. The second sentence
of the two-sentence discourse in (9b) below, for instance, does not meet
this requirement, and the discourse is ill-formed, indeed, while there is
no change in modal context.
The precise solution of the problem in (9a) even requires some ac-
commodation because a referent should be accessible to the other referent
(1.3) to which we would like to anchor it in order to express their ref-
erential identity. Accessibility in ReALIS can be defined on the basis of
worldlet hierarchy—in the most straightforward way: r1 is accessible to
r2 if the worldlet of r1 is lower than that of r2 according to the partial
ordering that makes the worldlet hierarchy.
The piece of information that should be accommodated here, as a
result of the singular definite expression in the second sentence of (9a),
is that the speaker accepts that “there is a huge entity behind the trees,
indeed”. The interpreter of the discourse, thus, introduces a referent r
to the relative root worldlet belonging to the dynamic interpretation of
the discourse. This referent r, then, is accessible to both r ′ (what Mary
thought to be a castle) and r ′′ (the huge oak tree the speaker can see).
One might think that it is suspiciously simple to have recourse to
accommodation again and again. We argue, however, that it a straight-
forward strategy of speakers that they tend to speak as little as possible
and, instead, they tend to entrust as much as (they hold) possible to
the interpreter’s information state. Instead of attempting to ignore in-
formation not expressed explicitly by words in formal semantic analyses,
we should strive for capturing this implicit information formally. The
“lifelong” approach of ReALIS makes it possible, at least, to start this
endeavor.
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Kálmán’s (1990) example in (9c) + (9c′/c′′) below is an excellent
illustration of accommodation. In our culture a minister is a potential
“distinguished participant” of a marriage whilst nothing similar holds
true of a dog. Nevertheless, it is not excluded that an interpreter considers
discourse (9c) + (9c′′) to be felicitous: what is needed is, say, a piece of
interpersonal knowledge about a salient dog in Peter’s life. It is relevant
that neither the minister in the former case, nor the dog in the latter
case can be found in any kind of closure of the interpreter’s information
state under logical entailment, so the cohesion holds between the present
sentences and ones learned long ago by the interpreter, in an unbounded
chronological distance. It is not logically closed possible worlds, thus,
which can provide an explanation, but the lifelong perspective offered by
ReALIS. The singular definite expression in (9c′/c′′) triggers a procedure
in the course of which the interpreter tries to extend his/her information
state resulting from understanding the first sentence (9c) so that the
extended information state contain a worldlet with a unique minister/
dog. This task can be executed, in the former case, by accommodating
cultural information concerning marriage in our Western culture, and it
might be executed, in the latter case, by accommodating interpersonal
information concerning Peter.
(9) Modal anchoring as an extreme case of intensional identity
(a) Mary thought that there was a castle behind the trees.
The castle turned out to be a huge oak tree. →(4b)
(b) Yesterday we visited two castles in an old town. *The castle was beautiful.
(c) Peter got married yesterday.
(c′) The minister spoke very harshly. / (c′′) ??The dog barked very loudly.
(d) Successful reference by means of a false piece of information:
A man arrives at a motel in the company of a girl who is not his wife at all
in a country where the porter (who knows the girl well. . . ) ought to prevent
them, lawfully, to share the same room. This is against his financial interest,
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however. Hence, the girl in question will be referred to as the guest’s wife
by both the guest himself and the porter in spite of the fact that neither of
them thinks this “presupposition” to be true and, moreover, neither thinks
that the other considers it to be true either. The porter says: I hope your
wife will enjoy this champagne.
(e) Yesterday Mary met an alleged spy.
In (9d) we have sketched another context in which a piece of information
(“your wife”) is used to identify a person, who belongs to different modal
contexts to the speaker and to the interpreter and, what is more, is held
to be false by both. ReALIS offers an explanation based on unicity of
the appropriate referents in certain worldlets. What the worldlet blocks
above in (9d) represent is that the wife to the guest is “the unique person
in the context such that he wants the porter to believe that she is his
wife”, and the wife to the porter is “the unique person in the context
such that he thinks that the guest wants him to believe that she is his
(the guest’s) wife despite that he knows well that she is not the guest’s
wife”.
A similar problem is illustrated in (9e) above. Alleged is qualified as
an irregular adjective by Kiefer (2000, 188) on the basis of its anomalous
properties compared to regular adjectives like old. We illustrate here the
test of two of the anomalous properties: an alleged spy is not (necessarily)
a spy whereas an old spy is a spy; and it cannot be said that He is alleged,
whereas He is old is a well-formed sentence.
The straightforward solution in our approach is that the difference
between regular and irregular adjectives is that the discourse-semantic
representation of a regular adjective is a predicate (like pcastle and pwife
above in (9a–d)) whilst the contribution of alleged concerns the modal
label of a worldlet. The speaker refers to a person by a piece of informa-
tion to whose truth she does not commit herself. She can identify him,
nevertheless, by expressing that he is “a person such that some people
believe that he is a spy”. In this way we could account for both the fact
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that He is a spy is no correct implication (as the speaker has not commit-
ted herself to the truth of this statement) and the fact that He is alleged
is ill-formed (alleged is not a predicate but a modal label).
4.3. Nob’s witch, which is Hob’s witch, and Phosphorus,
which is Hesperus
Now let us turn to the Hob-Nob Problem sketched in 1.5, which illustrates
that identity across possible worlds is not easy to represent formally in
possible-worlds semantics in the case of beings not present in the model
of the real world.
As is shown in (10b) below, ReALIS should cope with a similar
problem of identification. What is explicitly expressed by the words of
the famous sentence in (10a) can be represented by means of the “float-
ing” worldlet boxes in (10b): Hob believes e1 expressing that a witch,
denoted by r ′witch, has killed Cob’s cow, and Nob believes e2 expressing
that a definite woman, denoted by r ′′, has blighted Bob’s sow. These two
referents are not accessible to each other because they can be found in
incommensurate worldlets (one expressing Hob’s belief and another ex-
pressing Nob’s belief) in the partial ordering of the worldlet hierarchy.
Hence, at the moment we cannot account for the anaphoric character
of she.
(10) The Hob-Nob problem:
(a) Hob believes that a witch has killed Cob’s cow and
Nob thinks that she has blighted Bob’s sow. →(4a)
(b) A preparatory phase of dynamic interpretation:
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(c′) Interpretation1: (c′′) Interpretation2:
Thus we should have recourse to accommodation, again. What Zeevat
(2005, 549) writes, serves as a confirmation: “Now the literature con-
tains many explanations [. . .] Hob may have told Nob about his belief
[→(10c′′)], there may be a rumour in the village about a witch that
has played a causal role in the formation of Hob’s and Nob’s beliefs
[→(10c′)], there may have been an article in the local newspaper that
Hob and Nob have each read [→(10c′)].” Thus there might be different
contexts “behind” this sentence, but the special use of she does require
from the interpreter to consider some special contextual factor, that is,
to accommodate some information concerning the context.
What is represented by the worldlet structure in (10c′) in the frame-
work of ReALIS would be paraphrased by Zeevat (2005, 540) as follows:
Nob’s relevant belief is over Hob’s belief. In the other case (10c′′), the two
belief states are both over a certain “background” expressing the content
of the rumor/the article; these two cases can be handled uniformly, by
attributing the belief in the existence of a witch to a third person, r*, who
is the source of the rumor/author of the article. In the former case (10c′′),
Hob’s witch r ′witch has become directly accessible to Nob’s referent r
′′ due
to the embedding of the worldlets “floating” in the phase of (10b) in the
way triggered by the accommodated contextual information according to
Zeevat’s first scenario. In the latter case (10c′), a new referent r ′′′witch
has been introduced which is accessible both to Hob’s witch r ′witch and
to Nob’s referent r ′′ due to the embedding of the worldlets “floating” in
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the phase of (10b) in the way triggered by the accommodated contextual
information according to Zeevat’s second or third scenario.3
Now we are in a position to return to the problem of intersubjectivity,
illustrated in (1d) in 1.1, because in our approach this problem is similar
to the Hob-Nob problem.
We need the solution of this latter problem according to the scenario
in (10c′), where the speaker (i) is to attribute the referent of a witch
(r*witch) to a (not necessarily known) “source” (of a rumor), denoted by
i* in (10d′) below, and this referent is situated in a way that both Hob’s
witch referent and Nob’s witch referent will be “over” it in the sense
used by Zeevat (2005, 540). Referent r*witch, thus, is accessible to both
referents in question (which are not accessible to each other directly). It
is irrelevant, then, that there is no corresponding witch outside.
The figure in (10d′′) below shows a similar configuration of referents,
repeated twice.
(10) (d′) (d′′)
3 One might think that the placement of Nob’s worldlet of belief over Hob’s (10c′′)
or r*’s (10c′) worldlet of belief may result in the, incorrect, implication that Hob/
r* believes that Nob thinks that the witch who has blighted Bob’s sow coincides
with the witch who has killed Cob’s cow. What is not (necessarily) true is that
Hob/r* knows about Nob’s opinion at all. Fortunately, our representations in
(10c′/c′′) do not contain a formula like this: s: pbelieve rHob/r* s2; and as internal
worlds are not closed under an operation which might produce this formula, our
approach will not result in the incorrect implication in question. Nevertheless, in
normal dialogues it can potentially be accommodated that if i2 ’s belief relies on
i1 ’s belief, then i1 is likely to realize i2 ’s belief.
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What corresponds to the rumor in Hob and Nob’s village is the two Baby-
lonians’ assumed common background knowledge according to which
there is a bright heavenly body seen in the evening sky, called Hespe-
rus, and another star seen in the morning sky, called Phosphorus. What
counts, is only the configuration of internal entities in the box structure
expressing the relevant participants’ beliefs; and that there is only one
heavenly body outside instead of two entities is as irrelevant as the lack
of a real witch outside in the Hob-Nob puzzle. The properly situated
referents r*Hesp and r*Phos, thus, have helped in accounting for the coref-
erentiality of the two Babylonians’ two distinct “private objects”, due to
the fact that the former two referents are accessible to the latter four
referents.
Landman’s (1986) own solution is based on a mathematical construc-
tion that he calls “pegs”: “they are the objects we assume in conversation”
(128). In his opinion (131), “my view of the world represents my private
belief and your view of the world yours, they still are information states,
and if both ascribe properties to a peg, they do not each ascribe its own
private properties to its own private peg, but they ascribe intersubjective
properties to one and the same peg. And the same holds for the entities
that figure in my belief about the world, and in my belief about your
belief about the world. [. . .] While we were talking we may have reached
a stage in which we could decide that two pegs were identical, because,
relative to our assumed standard of precision, there were no facts left to
be added to our information that could distinguish them.” The internal
entities serving as referents in ReALIS share certain properties with the
partial objects that Landman calls pegs (see details in Alberti–Kleiber
2012), but we claim that it is a crucial innovation that our referents
are regarded as belonging to mind representations consisting of worldlets
that capture our beliefs, desires and intentions pertaining to both the
external world and the content of each other’s mind. It is through these
peculiar representations that the above discussed referential chains can
be set up, typically due to linguistic cues (e.g. pronouns, definite articles,
proper names) and contextual circumstances, and almost never due to
having reached, in a conversation, “a stage in which we could decide that
two pegs were identical”. It is not excluded at all that the two Babylo-
nians in the example above know, think and believe radically different
things about, say, Hesperus, while they can speak about it successfully.
It is hopeless to calculate “the assumed standard of precision”, mentioned
above as a part of Landman’s formulation, on the basis of which it should
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be decided whether two sets of pieces of information, i.e., “two partial ob-
jects”, which may be very different, refer to the same thing in a given
conversation, or not.
5. Summary
We have proposed a general solution to a related set of stubborn problems
that the mainstream Kripke/Montague-inspired possible-worlds seman-
tics suffers from: problems concerning expressions with the same ref-
erence/meaning/truth value, accessibility of referents, modal anchoring
and intensional identity, and—generally—representing beliefs, desires,
intentions.
This solution relies on embedding discourse representations—to-
gether with representations of interpreters’ minds creating them— in
the world model, by which we can get rid of the intermediate level of rep-
resentation between linguistic form and world model, while preserving
its content and relevant structural characteristics. In this way represen-
tationalist dynamic semanticists’ useful referent hierarchies (visualized
by Kampian boxes) are saved while antirepresentationalists’ principal
theoretical demand pertaining to the elimination of the “extra level” of
representation has also been satisfied. Our approach, called ReALIS, also
promises the reconciliation of the traditionally antipsychologist formal se-
mantics and the cognitive approach whose representatives traditionally
rejecting formalism. As for this latter topic, a second article (Alberti–
Kleiber 2012) will be devoted to the comparison of ReALIS with it and
other seminal related works in the field: Landman’s (1986) theory on
partial objects, DRT (Kamp et al. 2011), SDRT (Asher–Lascarides 2003)
and Situation Semantics.4
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